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Rhetoric and Somatics: 
Training the Body to do the Work of Law 
Peter Goodrich 
In a passage of the Lawiers Logike that is ostensibly concerned with 
the rhetorical figures of description, Abraham Fraunce surprisingly 
defines "chronographia," the description of time, by reference to 
its antithesis. Citing "Master Lambard", Fraunce gives the following 
example: "an arrest is a certain restraint of a man's person, depriving 
it of his own will and liberty, and binding it to become obedient to 
the will of the law; and it may be called the beginning of 
imprisonment."1 (1588a: 64r) Stasis or arrestation of the body is 
here used ironically to exemplify interruption of the essentially 
incorporeal passage of time. Spatial confinement is used to signify 
a certain displacement or self-consciousness of temporality. 
Similarly inverting the usual order of disciplines, Fraunce uses law 
to exemplify rhetoric: a legal definition is used to illustrate what 
Renaissance rhetoricians variously term a "sensable figure" 
(Puttenham 1589: 136, 148) or "figure of amplification." (Peacham 
1593: R iv b) In Fraunce's own Ramist lexicon, the figure of 
description is termed "an imperfect definition" and, again using a 
legal example of the general category of figure or scheme, he cites 
the maxim "the common law is common use." (Fraunce 1588a: 64) 
While there is a certain critical radicalism to Fraunce's 
Renaissance inversion of the disciplines, his subjection of law to 
rhetoric, I wish here to elaborate a more unusual and contemporary 
reading of the figure of corporeal imprisonment that is used to 
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illustrate the indefinable quality of temporality. In Lambard's 
definition, imprisonment implicitly renders the body docile and so 
amenable to instruction (docere) or inscription of law. The body is 
both the site and the conduit of submission of the soul to the 
"will of the law": arrest deprives the person of will so as to replace 
it, to bind it, to the meaning and form of law. While in one sense 
the superimposition of a collective intentionality upon the itinerant 
form of the person is unexceptional, there is also a more complex 
play of person and will, body and soul that deserves expansion. 
The law is staged through the body, and it is through corporeality, 
through the characteristics and qualities of the body and its 
movements, that the most profound substrates of law are to be 
read: "the body of the Law is a human body; the substance to be 
counted, that which signifies, is not some eternal principle but rather 
the embodied subject, a physical presence ... [for] everyone comes 
to dance with the Law." (Legendre 1997: 37) 
There is, of course, an obvious sense in which forensic rhetoric 
played a part in the juridical inscription and fixation of the body. 
Under the rubric of elocution the rhetorical handbooks stipulated 
norms of gesture, dress and deportment, as well as of the 
appropriate degrees of physical expression of passion, from 
blushing to tears, from murmurs to the vocal modulations of rage. 
In the same vein, the rhetoric of memory required training of the 
body to receive the imprint of texts and events. The figures of 
discourse themselves can also, in this regard, be understood as 
signs of emotions (Goodrich 1995: 181), of the excitations of the 
body, which compose what Elias coined as the "invisible wall of 
affects" that constitute the psyche. (Elias, 1978: xii) It is in this 
sense that the body is prisoner of the soul (Foucault 1977: 30) and 
that through the long term training of the body, psyche and person 
come to take on their social form. To submit the person to the 
"will of the law" is thus a double arrestation, it confines the body 
so as to constrain the symbolic subject, that real yet non-corporeal 
body which is variously named psyche, consciousness, subjectivity 
or soul. 
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Training the body to do the work of law is thus a much broader 
problematic than that of simple interpretation and observance of 
the positive norms of legislation and judicial decree. Just as the 
body as the object of law is an intermediary surface, the site of an 
economy of knowledges, investments, and powers, so too "the 
law" m~st be understood recursively as the site of a complex of 
disciplines and strategies. Law is in this sense itself an effect of 
knowledges and practices that are strictly speaking extrinsic to it. 
Legal dogmatics, in this respect, is an unconscious discipline: not 
only is law bound explicitly to the repetition of prior determinations, 
to the invocation of an indefinite past-inveterate usage, custom, 
habit, mores-as the structuring principle of present applications, 
but in a stronger sense the "micro-physics" ·or infinite particularity 
of law applying acts both give effect to and endeavour in turn to 
effectuate an institution of life, a constitution and manners, civility 
and justice that far exceed the bounds or knowledges of law.2 
The specific disciplinary transgression of strict legality to be 
addressed in this essay through the work of Abraham Fraunce and 
selected contemporaries, is that of rhetoric and the decorum, the 
affections and relationships, eloquence and intimacies it implies. 
Read in the context of the ascendancy of Ramist dialectics and the 
submission of all the disciplines to the rule of method, there is a 
subtle and as yet unremarked subversion at work in Fraunce's 
critique of law from the perspective of what is in effect a rhetorical 
reason. Fraunce in his turn arrests law and submits it to the will of 
the exterior norms of rhetoric as well as the scholastic rule of 
methodical reason. More than that, however, the rhetorical critique 
of law subjects the discipline or doctrinal discourse of legality to 
the reassertion of the form of life, the fantasmatic structure or 
imagination, that rhetoric ideally implies. It is in this respect that 
Fraunce is most radical and it is here that Fraunce's critique starts, 
with the economy of the disciplinary body, and with its corporeal 
manifestations. 
It is no accident that it is the pretended isolation of lawyers, 
and particularly the legal hostility to scholarship, that is blamed for 
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the failings of law: "you would love the law, but sine rivalr. you 
would reign, but alone: hinc illae lachrymae." (Fraunce 1588a: 3v) 
That the jealousy or insularity of law should be made manifest by 
tears, by physical insignia, should also be understood epistemically. 
Law marks the body and effects its strategies of governance through 
the inscription of emotions: through boredom, fear, 
embarrassment, love and the historical signs of attachment or 
denial. The lawyer cannot do other than inhabit the domain of the 
senses, that of the bodies that are subject to law in the manner of 
subjects, and in recognising this substrate of the logic of law, 
Fraunce enters immediately a tradition of rhetoric in which 
eloquence is the arbiter of both justice and love, in which the poem 
is the essential practice of amorous relationship, and law is at best 
a figure of poetic expression and of the rhetorical judgement that 
it inspires. (Goodrich 2001) 
Of the causes of the corruption of eloquence 
To read the Lawiers Logike as a critique of law based in rhetoric and 
poetics as much as in logic itself is to read the work somewhat 
against the grain. Two observations can perhaps facilitate such a 
reading. The first is that the Lawiers Logike is to be understood 
within the corpus of Fraunce's work and indeed is only formally 
comprehensible if understood as, amongst other things, the sibling 
of his poetry and as the other face of the Arcadian Rhetorike. (1588b) 
For Fraunce, as for the ancient orators, "it is the poets, writers of 
imagination, who still maintain the stock of natural logic that 
scholasticism's falsehoods have perverted." (Dzialo, 1998: 9) 
Rhetoric, in consequence, must necessarily and explicitly suffuse 
the method of law because it is the discipline that most directly 
reads the imagination and so offers access to the proper learning 
of law, the knowledge of things divine and human, the combination 
of spiritual and temporal, of body and soul.3 
The second and more expansive consideration is that of the 
tradition of rhetorical critique of law to which the Lawiers Logike 
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belongs. There is, of course, a certain common ground that 
associates Fraunce most closely with the reforming impetus of 
Ramism and specifically with the English reception of that neo-
scholastic movement. (Howells 1956: 249-255, Ong 1958, Vickers 
1988) As is well known, Fraunce studied under the English Ramist 
Gabriel Harvey and while at Cambridge attended the lectures that 
were published as Ciceronianus. (1577, 1945) Amongst the many 
virtues of Harvey's treatise is a critical distance from authority, 
worship of the ancients or any of the erstwhile "Gods of latinity." 
(1945: 69) In the spirit of cisalpine humanism counterposed to 
classicist antiquarianism, Harvey counselled a scholarship that 
transcended disciplinary boundaries, and a rhetoric that looked 
beyond the surface of discourse, the words or body of the text, to 
the varied knowledges that it entailed: "in studying Cicero the 
imitators ought to study not only his latinity but his resources of 
wisdom and factual knowledge." (1945: 73) 
Fraunce's sweeping critique of legal method clearly draws upon 
Harvey's urbane interpretations of Cicero and Ramism, but he 
also draws upon a more specifically juridical post-Ciceronian 
tradition of controversiae and of resistance to the peculiarly legal 
forms of the corruption of eloquence. In reconstructing this 
tradition as running from Cicero's Pro Archia poeta oratio (1923 ed), 
through Quintilian's lost work De causis corruptae eloquentiae (Brink 
1989), to Tacitus' Dialogus de oratoribus, (1914 ed) I wish to make 
explicit both the interdependence of poetics and law, and the 
epistemic distinction of poetry as the form through which it is 
possible to know and judge law by criteria that both exist in and 
address a beyond of law. The court that judges the legitimacy of 
legality was not historically the Kantian court of reason but rather 
the court of rhetoric and its laws of love. 
The theme is implicit in Pro Archia and deserves a brief initial 
interrogation. Cicero's defence of the poet and of poetry begins 
with an assertion of the "common bond of a mutual relationship" 
that binds together all the arts and addresses the shared theme of 
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how best to live. (Cicero 1923: i. 2) Already, in other words, the 
orator addresses law in terms of a poetically accessible beyond of 
law, a domain which is later depicted in terms of friendship, of the 
spirit and the senses. It is through literature and poetry that the 
forensic orator finds inspiration, purpose and the pleasure that 
accompanies "having never failed my friends." (vi. 13-14) In the 
face of the clamour and wrangling of law, "the name of the poet is 
holy." (viii. 18) It is through poetry that law gains its meaning, its 
inviolability: "if the soul (animus) were haunted by no presage of 
futurity, if the scope of her imaginings were circumscribed by the 
spatial limitations-the measures-of human existence" then 
neither law nor lawyer would have any reason to labour, suffer, 
lose sleep, or otherwise struggle for life itself. (xi. 29) Poetry was 
thus the vehicle of loyalty and the primary medium of friendship. 
Law was but an instrument through which the poetic designs of 
love could find an impermanent protection or expression. 
The rhetorical submission of law to the designs of friendship 
and the dictates of imagination or more properly fate, are themes 
that frequently return in the Ciceronian tradition. In jurisprudential 
argot these are the figures of the natural law tradition which, in 
good Platonic form, bind the shadowy domain of positive law to 
the role of reflecting a prior law, that of nature, of the first Venus 
or love. (Goodrich 1997; 2001) For the Ciceronian orator, legality 
is bound to obey an imagination or vision embedded in atheistically 
given nature and encoded in laws of amity and love that gain their 
proper expression in poetry, in lyric and literature, rather than in 
the dead prose-Bacon's litera mortua--of law. (Bacon 1630: A 2 a) 
Law itself, in this tradition, was but mutus magistratus and could only 
come to life through rhetoric, through speech. It is this concept of 
law, this hermeneutic structure which addresses law as being the 
reflection or image of another poetry or cause, that finds expression 
in Quintilian and in Tacitus ip the specific form of an attack upon 
the ineloquence or corruption of the forensic schools of rhetoric, 
and so also of the letters of the law. 
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In that the text of the De causis has been lost, our only access 
to the work is through the Institutio oratoria. (Quintilian 1996 edn) 
That is perhaps reason enough to divagate briefly into the definition 
of rhetoric that the latter work provides. The definition of rhetoric 
as bene dicendi scientia, comes in the course of a lengthy discussion in 
book two of the Institutes. (II.xv. 34, 38) Reviewing that definition, 
in the course of an excavation of the meanings of casuistry, 
Legendre comments insightfully on the philology of the phrase 
and concludes that "the work (opus) of interpretation is 
accomplished through the labour of the actor (artifex)," the artist 
who devotes her time to the cause of speaking well, to bona oratio 
or just speech. "Casuistry is thus to be understood as the art of 
speaking justly. Whether oral or written, discourse must be just." 
(Legendre 1992: 384) It is the legal orator whom Quintilian 
addresses in this definition, and that the advocate speaks well means 
that he speaks justly, that is according to the definitions, norms 
and doctrines that constitute the justice (iustitia) from which law 
derives its name (ius). 
Following in the Ciceronian tradition, Quintilian's desire to 
equate eloquence with justice also implies a rhetorical judgement 
of law: insofar as human law is just, it is so because it has found a 
language that approximates more or less accurately and so more or 
less eloquently to the unwritten reason or ghostly inscriptions of 
nature herself Positive law should in these terms endeavour ideally 
to reflect the inchoate language, the images or primary words of 
the spirit that was their origin or cause. The best language, to borrow 
from Sir John Fortescue, was a pristine language, one that had 
been spared being "altered and depraved by common use" 
(Fortescue 1460, 1737 edn: 108), and hence was a language that 
was just to the extent that it rendered the justice it transcribed in 
the language of its original expression. Whatever the precise 
conception of nature or god that motivated the hierarchy of laws, 
the hermeneutic significance of the definition is resident in the 
formulation of a rhetoric that is bound to read law in terms of a 
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justice that exceeds it. For Quintilian and for Tacitus, rhetoric 
addressed and judged law by reference to a domain of spirit, animus 
and ethos, that transgressed strict legality and so also the habitual 
bounds or litera mortua of juristic expression. 
The interrelation of justice and eloquence can be given further 
illustration by looking in detail at the discursive context and the 
specific form in which the definition of rhetoric is given. Book 
two of the Institutio is concerned most broadly with the education 
of the young orator, with the exercises, instructions and narratives 
through which the "young boy" can be brought to appreciate the 
dependence of rhetoric upon truth (veritas) or, in Ciceronian terms, 
the real. To appreciate the proper forms of legal argument thus 
not only requires that youth be inculcated with a sense of the real, 
but also that the corporeal reality of puerility-the exuberance, 
ardour, imaginative excess, poetic licence and luxuriance of the 
young-be acknowledged. Thus the teacher of rhetoric is a nurse 
to the student, feeding milk to the mind and attending to the plump 
body (plenus corpus) of the juvenile orator. The virtues of rhetoric 
are inculcated early and the soul is trained not least by corporeal 
routines and the other finely grained interventions into attitude, 
expression and emotion. What is noteworthy for a contemporary 
analysis of the epistemology of legal rhetoric is the persistence of 
the corporeal referent of knowledge and speech. 
Even in the work of a conservative such as Quintilian, poetry 
is placed in advance of law and the licence, imaginings, and other 
excitations and drives generated by the poetic sustain the early 
training of the legal mind. (1996 edn: Bk. II. iv. 2-8) The virtues as 
well as the motives for speech are alike grounded in the poetic, in 
the fire or the passion that is aroused most strongly in the youthful 
orator. When it comes to the specific depictions of just speech, 
the same corporeal object domain of action, of the real as truth, is 
again intrinsic to the proper demarcation of just and unjust speech. 
If justice in practice means speaking justly, the definition of justice 
also necessarily implies a practice or domain of oratorical acts. It is 
248 
Rhetoric and Somatics 
for this reason that Quintilian foreshadows his exegesis of the 
meanings of rhetoric by examining the institutions and practices 
of legal oratory. How, he asks, did the ancients exercise their 
"powers of speaking" (facultatem dicendi exercuerunl), what were the 
objects, directions, qualities and tones of their rhetorical acts? (Bk 
II. iv. 33-41) The answer to that question again lies in the subtle 
education of the juristic soul. 
Before arriving at the ideals of eloquence and justice it is 
necessary to observe the salutary images of ineloquence and 
injustice. The insertion of training in legal rhetoric in the domain 
of practice lodges the legal firmly in history, in the temporal, 
corporeal and failing world of events. The truth of that world is 
that injustice and the cacozelia or pernicious words through which it 
is known are more common than acts of genuine felicity or just 
measure. To understand the eloquence of justice, it is necessary 
first to appreciate the theory of declamation and attend to the 
corruptions of speech to which, historically, it has given rise. 
Declamation, the dialectical method of scholastic argument for 
and against a particular point of fact or law, was the principal means 
of training in the controversiae of legal rhetoric. The educational 
virtue of declamation lay in its imitation of the real, in the fidelity 
of its representation of the practice of lawyers and courts. In the 
present day, however, Quintilian observes, declamation has 
"degenerated to such an extent. .. that it has become one of the 
chief causes of the corruption of modern oratory." The rhetorical 
roots of this corruption lie in "the extravagance and ignorance" 
(licentia atque inscita) of our declaimers who, abandoning all 
semblance of the real-simillimae veritatis-or any actual 
declamation, debate the doings of magicians, plagues and oracles, 
the fantastical cruelty of stepmothers and other unreal things. (Bk. 
II. ix. 5-6) 
The detachment of speech from the real is not only an epistemic 
failing, a rant or lunacy, but is also depicted as a physical defect. 
The ignorant and engorged declaimer is like a cow that has blown 
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itself out with a surfeit of green food and just as the cow has to be 
cured by blood-letting, so the declaimer "should be rid of his 
superfluous fat and his corrupt humours must be discharged." (Bk 
II. x. 6-8) In a later passage from Book V, the theme of the "swollen 
emptiness" of the declaimer is revisited in sexualised corporeal 
terms: "declaimers are guilty of exactly the same offence as slave-
dealers who castrate boys in order to increase the attractions of 
their beauty," to which is added the thesis that "[a] false resemblance 
to the female sex may in itself delight lust, if it will, but depravity 
of morals will never ... succeed in giving real value to that which it 
has succeeded in giving a high price." (Bk V. xiii. 18, 19-20) 
Desexualisation through mutilation is here made the equivalent of 
injustice in the realm of speech: empty oratory is an injustice that 
equiparates with the most extreme violence against the order of 
nature and specifically against the sexuality that defines corporeality. 
Just as the soul is inscribed through the training of the body, 
through the institutional and everyday routines that give the body 
affect and speech, so too the body-its attitudes, tones, deportment 
and dress-is in turn the expression of the qualities of the soul. 
Justice in these terms refers to far more than law, and the justice of 
speech to which legal oratory is gauged or directed has 
correspondingly to be understood according to a much finer series 
of juridical nuances than is usually acknowledged either in rhetoric 
or law. In Pauline terms, speech is the spirit, it is the soul in the 
body, it is breath and it is life. While the soul may in Christian 
terms have priority over the body, it is only known through, or 
accessible by means of the body. In the same vein, the body is in 
classical terms an image, a mode of transport between words and 
things, a site of passage that exists according to the various 
chimerical temporalities of memory and hope.4 
For Quintilian, the corruption of speech is the sign of injustice, 
of the degeneration of body and soul, of violence and anti-nature. 
Put differently or simply in a positive formulation, one aspect of 
legal rhetoric is that of maintaining, both at the level of education 
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and of practice, the criteria and values, the attitudes and relations 
upon which just speech depends. It is these political and aesthetic 
questions that Tacitus picks up and elaborates in the Dialogus and 
to which some brief further consideration is appropriate. Although 
it has been persuasively argued that the Dialogus draws heavily upon 
Quintilian's lost De Causis (Brink 1989), it is also a work that is 
amenable to a more radical and political interpretation than is the 
earlier work. At the very least, Tacitus is more explicit as to the 
centrality of poetics to judgement, and so of politics-of 
relationships, loves and the other affects of the intimate public 
sphere-to the justice or injustice of laws and of their application. 
In the Dialogus the theme is explicitly that of the character and 
value of the practice of law. Rhetoric is here expressly the court 
that will judge the practice of law and specifically address the charge 
laid against the schools of legal rhetoric, namely that they were in 
his day degenerate, ignorant and immoral "schools of 
shamelessness" (ludum impudentiae). (Tacitus 1914 edn: 108) In other 
words, if the legal institution is to be judged and professional 
practice appraised, it cannot be by the profession itself but must 
be from some point outside of the legal institution. It is for that 
reason that the court is that of rhetoric-in modern terms one 
would say scholarship-and judgement is given by the lawyer's 
peers, the practitioners of the other branches of rhetoric, namely 
the epideictic and deliberative genres, the practices of poetics and 
politics. 
The question of who is to judge is intimately linked to the quality 
of judgement. Here it is not insignificant that the principal judge, 
Maternus, a loosely masked representation of Tacitus himself, is 
presented as a poet, an epideictic rhetorician, and that his criteria 
of judgment are drawn in the main from his reasons for no longer 
practising law. (Tacitus 1914 edn: 37) For Maternus, the yoke of 
the practice of law, the acrimony, racket, hazard, greedy mania and 
tears of the legal market-place held little charm when compared to 
the tranquillity and recursive care of poetry: "Here is the cradle of 
251 
Goodrich 
eloquence, here is its holy of holies; this was the form and fashion 
in which the faculty of utterance first won its way with mortal 
men, steeming into hearts that were as yet pure and free of the 
stain of guilt; poetry was the language of the oracles." (47) It is the 
function of poetry, in this definition, to care for the soul and to 
cultivate the spirit. Poetics, and by association literature, ar~ the 
non-instrumental arts that ordain the purpose of institutional 
existence and the criteria for valuing individual lives.5 Devolving 
from these poetic criteria, the rhetoricians determine that there are 
two structural causes of the decline of legal oratory. First, there is 
the separation of legal rhetoric from its basis in literature and 
poetics. This is deemed to be both a failing of historical 
understanding and an aesthetic lapse. In historical terms, following 
Cicero, poetry is the original basis of community and institution, it 
is the first law and poets are the first lawgivers. Poetry, in short, 
precedes and underpins both the value and the practice of law and 
it is to the peril of lawyers that they forget that genealogy or genesis. 
(49-51) The poetic contract thus precedes the legal contract: to the 
extent that law is the expression of social stability, it depends upon 
the images of identity, the sentiments of community and the 
practices of virtue that poetry instil. 
The separation of law from literature is accompanied by a 
correlative disjunction of theory and practice in the schools of 
forensic rhetoric or what would now be termed the legal academy. 
Granted the juridical view, both ancient and modern, that poetry 
and literature are distinct from law precisely by virtue of the non-
instrumental character of the aesthetic, its lack of direct impact 
upon the polity or the real, it is ironic that Tacitus views the 
separation of law and literature as a dimension of the estrangement 
of the theory of legal rhetoric from practice or the public sphere. 
To the extent, however, that poetry precedes both politics and law 
it follows that the separation of legal rhetoric from poetics is a 
separation of law from the practice, the life-style and values, in 
short the embodiment that poetry represents. It was a practice 
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concerned, according to Maternus, with the inculcation of virtue 
and with care of the soul and was in consequence intrinsic to the 
polity or to the real in a much more tangible sense than the agonistic 
and superfluous activities of legal orators who sought either venal 
advantage or self-aggrandisement. 
Drawing upon the criticisms of the corruption of speech, and 
particularly the bond between ineloquence and injustice, Tacitus 
places just speech in the domain of action: "For the real basis of 
eloquence is not theoretical knowledge (cognoscam) only, but in a far 
greater degree natural capacity and practical exercise." Slightly later, 
and in a curiously contemporary tone, Tacitus affirms that "theory 
(artibus) involves practice, and it is impossible for any one to grasp ... 
diverse and abstruse subjects, unless their theoretical knowledge is 
re-enforced by practice ... " (103) In the political reading that Tacitus 
gives to the causes of the corruption of eloquence, the truth of 
law lies in its practice: the actors in the drama of law are eloquent 
and so just only to the extent that their speech embodies the ethos, 
the knowledges and the virtues, which ideally allow law to contribute 
to the civility of the public sphere. To the extent that the lawyer as 
actor intervenes in the polity, their speech is the form of their 
practice, and that speech, to borrow this time from Cicero, "enacts 
the real." (1982 edn: 3. 214) 
Turning, finally, to the causes of the corruption of legal 
eloquence, which is the explicit theme of the Dia/ogus, Tacitus 
elaborates three complex sets of signs of juristic estrangement or 
disaffection, three marks of injustice. The first sign is the increasing 
separation of the lawyer from the real, which here means not simply 
alienation from the public sphere of legal action, but equally a 
disembodiment or emptying of the legal subject, an estrangement 
from the poetic sources, the truths or fates which law expresses. 
Adopting a version of Quintilian's analysis, the schools are berated 
for debating themes such "the reward of the king-killer," "a remedy 
for the plague," or the "incestuous mother," in that such themes 
are remote from political reality and irrelevant to the causes that 
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are pleaded in court. (f acitus 1914 edn: 111) The estrangement of 
the school from the real is also expressed in the self-estrangement 
of the lawyer, in the collapse of the identity or personality of the 
jurist to which later critics of law have so often returned. If 
education in the rhetoric of law inculcates an abstruse and politically 
irrelevant casuistry, an unreal and so unjust oratory, then the 
estrangement of the legal institution from the life of the polity will 
inevitably also be reflected in the narcissistic isolation of the 
individual lawyer whose public persona is predicated upon having 
nothing to say. 
The decline of the law schools is not an autonomous event, 
but is linked explicitly to the deterioration in the ethos and episteme 
of legal practice. The second sign of the corruption of legal 
eloquence lies in a species of stylistic and argumentative decay. 
Legal language becomes divorced from the vernacular and 
increasingly alien to the realities of everyday discourse. The 
"bombastic style" (109) and "magniloquent phraseology" (111) of 
the schools is a symptom of the divorce of legal language from 
any significant or ethical role within the public sphere. Law becomes 
a matter of hierophantic dictate or pontifical pronouncement rather 
than being related in any direct manner to the lives, the languages, 
or the values of those governed. In an argument that has been 
revived repeatedly, Tacitus suggests that the ethics of law can be 
measured by the language used by lawyers. More specifically, judged 
by the traditional criteria of appropriateness of language to subject-
matter and to audience, the language of law was deemed obscure, 
empty and largely self-referential. The language, in other words, 
reflected the separation of law from its sources, and of legal practice 
from the public sphere. By contrast, to borrow one of the more 
famous formulations of the Dialogur. "Great oratory is like a flame: 
it needs fuel to feed it, movement to fan it, and it brightens as it 
burns." (111) 
The failings of legal language reflect a degeneracy that is both 
ethical and aesthetic. The final sign or criterion of the corruption 
254 
Rhetoric and Somatics 
of legal eloquence is aesthetic. In a surprising yet resonant argument, 
Tacitus suggests that the decline of forensic oratory is expressed 
in a style of dress that has become ridiculous, and in an architecture 
that belittles the space and significance of legality. Of dress, Tacitus 
. remarks: "take those gowns into which we squeeze ourselves when 
addressing the court, the costume prevents all movement, and well 
reflects the orator's loss of dignity and credibility." (119-21) 
Allowing for a reading that acknowledges the vital role of the 
aleatory and sumptuary in the governance of the body, and so too 
in the inscription of the soul, the reference to the corporeal 
constraint and absurdity of the legal toga is complex. (Goodrich 
1998) What is lost initially is the corporeal freedom necessary to 
the expression of ideas, to gesture and elocution, tone and style. 
Already it is hard to imagine eloquence where the speaking subject 
lacks the sartorial room to expand and expatiate. More than that, 
however, the issue is explicitly also one of credence and dignity, of 
justum and decorum. The loss of decorum is a loss of the poetry or 
sensibility that attaches the persona of the lawyer to the ethos of 
law. This collapse of the symbolic order, even where expressed in 
signs as seemingly peripheral as dress, marks again the classical 
sense in which the enactment of the real, the corporeal practice of 
law, is the proper measure of both its eloquence and its justice. 
Where law plays out the drama of public life upon a bare stage and 
before an empty auditorium; where the agon of the courtroom 
proceeds in "a scene of desolation" (121), without witness, purpose 
or style, then the material impoverishment of law likely reflects a 
much deeper corruption of speech. 
The law of tears 
In Christian doctrine, the discourse on tears was addressed primarily 
to the proper forms of expression of mourning at the death of a 
loved one.6 The tears expended at funerals were to be restrained, 
weeping was to be ordered and the various physiological signs of 
penitence or loss were alike to be governed by doctrines of 
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retention. The body, in other words, does not belong to the subject, 
and cannot be given over to spontaneous lachrymose subversions. 
The body and its desires were subjugated to law, and in Christian 
doctrine that meant a law which perceived life as a wound and 
death as metamorphosis rather than destruction of the body. 
Spontaneous weeping thus signified a feminine dissolution of 
reason in emotion, and in consequence it had a negative meaning, 
tears were signs of meanness and of evil. To call out or supplicate 
with tears was permissible only according to the specified forms 
of the liturgy and in this instance the tears would be silent and 
inter~al or 'mystical'. Ceremonial tears marked a joyous waiting 
(langor mirabi/is) or even a purification of the body as part of the 
rite of prayer, of pro petitione lacrymarnm. 
That Abraham Fraunce alludes to the dogmatics of tears early 
on in his criticism of the common law can be interpreted according 
to the differing levels of meaning attributed to weeping. Most 
immediately, and Tacitus too had made this observation, tears and 
tear-stained faces were part of the reality of petition and cause. 
Tears may here have marked the distance between poetry and law 
but they also signified the hazards, dangers and corruptions of 
legal practice. Tears in this sense had no part to play in the discourse 
of law and indeed weeping was an illicit gesture or argument, an 
affect and not a reason. While there can be no doubt that Fraunce's 
reference to tears shed both amongst and in response to the 
activities of the voces vena/es of the legal market-place is a criticism 
of unnecessary or illogical weeping, it is also a criticism directed 
most expressly at lawyers, at the "upstart rabulae farensel' (Fraunce 
1588a: 4r) themselves. If we read Fraunce's discourse through the 
rhetorical tradition that impugns the causes of the corruption of 
eloquence, then the reference to tears and to the hi/aritas or 
"dunsicality" (Sv) of lawyers are literal and explicit signs of 
estrangement from the real. The tears here mark an epistemic loss 
with a corporeal trace. Each term of that loss, both the jealousy 
and the pain of law, can be sketched by way of the earlier discourse 
on the corruption of legal eloquence. 
256 
Rhetoric and Somatics 
The specific context of Fraunce's critique of legal ineloquence 
needs to be sketched in terms of the material contexts and physical 
effects of the corruption of speech. Abraham Fraunce had moved 
from Cambridge University to the Inns of Court, and Lincoln's 
Inn specifically. He had moved from one place to another and 
from one school to another. His critique of law is school based. It 
is directed at the habits and practices, the methods and 
performances, of the Inns of Court: "Men reason in schools as 
philosophers, in Westminster as lawyers, in Court as lords, in country 
as worldly husbands." (3v) As Walter Ong has observed, the 
school-whether philosophical or legal-is defined by an 
architecture of place, by the materiality and location of a practice. 
(Ong 1958) Derived etymologically from scho/a, meaning among 
other things classroom or place of learned conversation, the school 
is first of all a site of interaction, the material location or geography 
of a practice. Fraunce acknowledges this most explicitly through 
his metonymies of place: schoolroom for philosopher, Westminster 
for lawyer, Court for nobility and Inn of Court for the training of 
the body to do the work of law. 
The location of method and critique within an architecture and 
the other materialities of a practice, is also a mechanism for locating 
thought in the context of the embodiment of practice. Place 
connotes materiality and corporeality and hence provides the 
precondition for what Cicero and following him Fraunce termed 
veritas, the practice of law as the enactment of the real. Fraunce 
makes this connotation or connection explicit in going on to discuss 
the virtue of schools, and in particular that of the Inns of Court, 
in terms of their teaching of the "force" and the "consequence" 
of arguments. (7v-8r) Logic, and specifically the logic of law, was 
taught in schools and taught so as to train the student in the pragmata, 
in the effects of rhetoric, in the force of argument, in the 
performance of justice as enactment of the real. 
Training in law was a training in logic and rhetoric, a training in 
the emotional force and so also the physical effects of words. The 
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practice of rhetoric was not only defined by place-by the ambient 
location of the body-it was also defined by its relation to its 
auditory subjects, by the effect of the word upon its recipients. 
Consider again Fraunce's discussion of arrest, and here arrest in 
the context of the common law of treason: "If .. . a man calls 
another traitor, and he says noth;ng to this, he is by due process of 
law arrested for suspicion, and for this must answer to the 
accusation." ( 45r) Words can order, uplift and entreat, but they can 
also wound, arrest, or condemn. In each case, words inhabit a place 
and a relationship, a theatre of enactment or performance that 
leads Fraunce to opine significantly that "I will never think him 
worthy of the title and name logician, that never puts his general 
contemplation into particular practice .. . " (115r) The meaning of 
words, and the meaning of laws, lay in speech acts that incorporated 
both word and gesture, speech and context. The lawyer was 
necessarily engaged in a rhetorical performance, in the theatre of 
the real. 
Returning to the tears that mark the injustice of laws, their 
most immediate textual cause, for Fraunce, lies in the dispute 
between law and scholarship. It is here, drawing explicitly upon the 
classical antagonism between law and poetry, that Fraunce accounts 
the good scholar to be both a poet and orator. Scholarship here 
has both explicitly and tacitly a basis in poetics, and in terms 
reminiscent of Maternus' defence of poetry, Fraunce speaks of 
the "easy, elegant, conceited, nice and delicate learning" of the 
poet and of the skill that goes into the writing of verse. Poetry-
the "new found verses of Amyntas death" (2r)-and more 
practically the lyric affinities or "likeness of signs" that allow 
Plowden to remark "semblable reason, semblable ley" (73r) are 
unquestionably for Fraunce the greater or first source of law. In 
Ciceronian terms the poetic is the domain of invention and it is 
joined to law in the most practical of forms, namely that of method 
which joins rhetoric to logic and allows thereby both for "a more 
easy and elegant kind of disputation" and also for philosophical 
elaboration. (120r) 
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The polemical object of the Lawiers Logike is proclaimed early 
on to be that of bringing scholarship to law, and law to scholarship. 
(7r) Logic and law, in the words of the dedicatory poem, should 
become "nearest and dearest friends." In this argument, friendship 
belongs within the intimate public domain of the poetic, and 
scholarship itself is a secondary expression of sources grounded 
in the lyric of nature or law of love and transmitted by means of 
the universitas of philosophical friendships and their kindred texts.7 
It is important to recognise that the scholar is much more than 
simply a logician, and that method is in essence a formal enterprise 
or mode of disposition and presentation. The "university man" to 
whom Fraunce refers at length is someone who will bring to law 
the fruit of ten years of study and the wisdom of the disciplines 
and modes of inscription that should in the argument of the Lawiers 
Logike precede and revitalise the law. The figure of friendship is 
thus juxtaposed polemically to that of the unlearned, "dunsical," 
silly, confused and asinine. Again following the trajectory of the 
causes of the corruption of legal eloquence, it is possible to sketch 
Fraunce's contemporary exposition of the licence and ignorance, 
the /icentia and inscita, or even the /uxuria and ignorantia, that mark 
the body of law. 
At the risk of a certain reverse causality, the immediate context 
of Fraunce's criticism refers to "that hotchpotch French, stuffed 
up such with variety of borrowed words, wherein our law is 
written."8 (3r-v) It is the language of law that is in the first instance 
the cause of its "hard, harsh, unpleasant, unsavoury, rude and 
barbarous" (3r) character as an object-language of professional 
study. While the most profound reason given for the failings of 
language are the lawyer's resistance to university learning-to 
scholarship-and most particularly to the Ramistic concept of 
method, the corruption of legal eloquence and here the loss of 
e/egantia iuris lies rather in the failings of forensic rhetoric. Rhetoric 
must be tied to truth, indeed if it is to be eloquent and so just it 
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must enact the real. The real in its turn is the product of lengthy 
learning and subtle technique and it requires at a minimum a deep 
sense of the meaning and use of words. Here the poetic must be 
structured in a specific order or form: "fitly and according to cause, 
auditors, time, place and such like circumstances." (115r) Such is 
the charge of law, but it is one that requires first a sensibility to~ards 
words and their representation of the truth of things: "for words 
be notes of things, and of all words either derivative or compound, 
you may yield some reason set forth from the first arguments, if 
the notation be well made. [Etymology or notation] is called originatio, 
quod originem verborum explicet: et Erymologia, id est, veroloquium." (5 lr) 
The poetic truth of a word, as also the rhetorical force and 
significance of its use, depend upon a properly scholarly 
apprehension of its source or root in the domain of the originary. 
That the notion of the thing gains expression in the notation of 
the word is a common theme of humanist sensibility and one which 
Fraunce seeks tirelessly to propound "contrary to the prejudiced 
opinion of some silly penmen, and illogical lawyers, who think it a 
fruitless point of superfluous curiosity to understand the words 
of a man's own profession." (56v) If we follow the contrary or 
opposite set out in this argument, then the ignorance and the licence 
of the legal profession is marked more than anything else by a 
scholarly failure to understand words, and particularly the words 
of the law. The failing is both poetic and logical and so Fraunce is 
here again close to the classical topic or common place of the 
corruption of eloquence. The injustice of law is most expressly a 
failure to speak justly, a corruption of the relation of the lawyer to 
the real by virtue of their misapprehension of signs. 
The argument made by Fraunce as to the corruption of 
eloquence gains its most vivid expression in his polemic against 
contemporary lawyers. Again using a figurative language that first 
marks injustice as stylistic or oratorical infelicity, Fraunce directs 
his criticisms against "babblers" (57r), "seditious cavillers" (7r), 
"grand little mootmen" (89v), " silly penmen" and other 
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"singlesowld lawyers and golden asses" (62r) who practice an 
unlearned profession and "after some lewd bargain in the country, 
run immediately to the Inns of Court, and having in seven years 
space met with six French words, home they ride like brave 
magnificoes, and dash their poor neighbours children quite out of 
countenance, with villen in gros, villen regardant, and Tenan_t per 
curtesie." (7v-8r) The legal orator "[does) obscure things purposely; 
amplify; digress; flatter; insinuate; alter; change; and turn all upside 
down" (114r), placing first things last, and last things first. In this 
manner, "the greedy desire of a superficial show in unnecessary 
trifles makes us want the true substance" (62r) of common law. 
What is at stake in the corruption of legal eloquence is not 
simply a question of poor logic or of deficient style. In summing 
up his critique of common law, Fraunce explicitly links reform of 
legal method to ease of government, and felicity of expression or 
elegantia iuris to good order and felicity. (120r) He continues: "To 
conclude I could heartily wish the whole body of our law to be 
rather logically ordered, than by alphabetical breviarum torn and 
dismembered ... " (119v) To grasp the significance of this 
conclusion it needs to be place in its Renaissance context. The 
body of law was not an abstraction or estranged figure of speech, 
it was a metonymy, and specifically a prosopopoiea or face of both 
place and people, of the habits, customs, and other enactments of 
common law. The body of the law was conceived as a real body, a 
terrain or territory that Fraunce next speaks of in terms of English 
habit and national competence or jurisdiction. The body of law 
was very explicitly the body of the nation. It was what Fraunce's 
contemporary, the antiquarian scholar William Camd~n termed the 
chorograpf?y, the pattern or dance of a people living together over 
time. (Camden 1586) Lawyers and the common law were the 
emblems of this national body or habitually trained local realm. 
The body of the law was corpus mysticum or pax regem, but it was also 
and more interestingly a moveable body, the mark or geography of 
practice over time. 
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In the same vein, to tear or dismember the laws was to tear and 
dismember the patterns and interactions, the physical life and 
material practices of the Anglican dance, of the choreography that 
is English law. To tear the realm up was thus to tear people apart, 
to dismember subjects, to pull apart the members of the realm, 
the space and time and movement of England. And hence the 
tears, because ineloquence led to inelegant practices, and these in 
turn led to the inexorable decay, the slow dismemberment of the 
nation hersel£ All this, in other words, was for the want of words, 
for the lack of eloquence, for the loss of poetic and rhetorical 
skills. 
The "ungentle legists" (Ferne 1586: 93) that Fraunce impugns 
are unjust because they are ineloquent, they fail to speak justly and 
so omit to do justice in practice. Without expanding further upon 
this already well-rehearsed Ciceronian theme it should be noted 
that the principal political thesis advanced by Fraunce is one which 
seeks to restore ease, elegance and civility to the polity in the most 
immediate and physical or embodied of senses. The cause is both 
stylistically and substantially poetic and seeks to introduce a different 
truth or bond between words and things, and so too between 
rhetoric and judgement, between law and justice. The corruption 
of eloquence is the means through which the critic reads the 
disorder, confusion, indigestion and dismemberment of the 
substantive discipline, of the school and its practice. The failing of 
the unlearned and ineloquent lawyer is that of incivility. It is a 
political and rhetorical failing that enacts unpleasantness, harshness 
and loss of wealth and countenance. The lawyer has come adrift 
from the real through estrangement from the disciplines: the neglect 
of rhetoric, of the discipline of speaking well, transpires thus to 
be both a failure to care for the soul and a source of tears and 
lamentation, pain and loss, in the polity. The tears shed by virtue 
of the jealousy or inappropriate autonomy of law are real tears 
and mark indelibly the quality of civil life as it is inhabited, as it is 
embodied and lived. 
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Legal Somatics 
This essay has marked an historical and rhetorical trajectory around 
the figures of eloquence and the justice of the legal enactment of 
the real. The object of that trajectory has been the social body of 
law as expressed through the corporeal figure and the names of 
the lawyer. Its concern, to borrow a phrase, has been "the most 
delicate, the most fragile and the most representative element of 
the constitution of the social: the intimate relation which ties the 
phenomenon of the institution to the problematic of speech." 
(Legendre 1997: xiii) In the classical tradition of the causes of the 
corruption of eloquence that intimate relation was spelled out not 
only in terms of the necessary injustice of ineloquence, but also 
by way of a theory of the real as the site of an embodiment of 
justice in the practice of speech. If we turn finally to Fraunce's 
theory of the epistemic that the forensic orator would ideally 
inscribe, it is possible also to return to the theme of the body, both 
as metaphor and substance, in the work of law. 
There is, of course, a common theme in the curricula rhetorical 
manuals used at the Inns of Court that stresses physical moderation 
of diet, exercise, routine and continence as important aspects of 
learning the law, of memory and comprehension, and Fraunce relays 
some of that knowledge.9 While there is a certain poetic logic to 
the alimentary regulation of lawyers and to the ascetic and even 
melancholy physical regime recommended for students of law, it is 
no more than symptomatic of a broader theme which I will term 
legal somatics. Here we return to the earlier problematic of the 
inscription of law through the arrest of the body and, as Lambard 
puts it, the subjection of the person to the will of the law. It is here 
that Fraunce can be used not simply as a latter day instance of the 
tradition inaugurated in the De Causis, but also as the harbinger of 
a more novel reading of the legal institution: where law does not 
arrest, constrain or stop the person of the subject it must act in a 
more symbolic and repeated form. If arrest is not the usual course 
of enacting the law, that is because the normal mode of legal 
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inscription is directed to the unconscious or habitual body of the 
subject, to the somatics of repetition and the traces that it leaves. 
The question of the incorporation of law in what Blackstone 
later coined as the silent or tacit consent of the subject, in custom 
and use, is played out by Fraunce in a more radical epistemic form. 
In an important discussion of "borrowed arguments," Fraunce 
addresses the role of arguments from the authority of precedent 
in the unravelling of common law. Citing Plato, he makes the 
subversive argument that those who use the authority of others 
instead of arguments of their own "are fools ... [for] in these 
borrowed testimonies there is no reason or persuasion, but rather 
violence and compulsion." (1588a: 66v-67r) The borrowed 
argument is not a symbol of thought but rather the collapse of a 
symbol, and the most unjust of failures to enact the real. This 
form of repetition, this unthought by means of which the legal 
orator represents the will of the law, is not only a hermeneutic 
violence but equally a corporeal failing, a swollen emptiness that 
returns to haunt the body and scar the polity. 
Somewhat later the borrowed argument is again taken up and 
discussed in explicitly somatic terms. Under the methodical rubric 
of the exclusion of false and lame precepts, authorities without 
dignity, Fraunce remarks that if such a goal-pnma r~ufa.-could 
be achieved then "all repugnant dreams of serjeants and councellors 
that serve the time and speak for money should not run so current 
for good law: nay every judgment given either without reason, or 
with partiality, should not stand for justice: every semble, should 
not pass for a sentence, nor every dictum fuit, for a dictators 
constitution." (89r) The unreflectively repeated dreams of the 
serjeants of coif and of law could not be paraded as having the 
dignity of reason or the force of law. Again it is noteworthy that 
injustice is correlated to verbal acts, to bad sentences-dictum and 
dictate--and that these failures to enact the real of law are depicted 
as the work of a sleeping body, of a lethargic and indifferent 
constitution. 
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The problematic to which this criticism belongs is one which 
lies on the border of corporal and spiritual, at the juncture of 
dignity and rationality, of image and rule. One further example can 
make the point more directly. In a discussion of argumentative 
digressions, Fraunce remarks that impertinent digression "or rather 
repugnant imaginations continually cast in, mar all." (119r) With 
the reversion to imagination, which is also termed bad memory 
and disordered argument, we return to the poetic as the source of 
reason and the ethos that underpins law. To train the body to do 
the work of law is an ethical undertaking that is inevitably thwarted 
by the violence of brute precedent or the compulsion of 
unreasoned authority. To enact and so embody the truth of law in 
Ciceronian terms meant to act in accordance with the ethos and 
dictates of a higher law, a lex legum that was inscribed not in texts 
or positive judgements, but invisibly and creatively in the heart. All 
of which is to say that enacting the phantasmatically known laws 
of nature, kind and love, requires the inscription first of the 
rhetorical techniques of embodiment, an ease and openness of 
attitude and tone. The work of law is thus a work of transmission 
that exists on the fragile border across which the corporeal accedes 
to the spiritual and the imagination is formed. 
The last word belongs in this instance not to Fraunce but to his 
contemporary, lawyer and poet, George Puttenham. In his famous 
defence of 'English poesie', Puttenham addresses the decline in 
respect for poetry and poets. His contemporaries, he complains, 
hold the poet in disdain and call him "a light headed or phantasticall 
man." (1589: 14) To this disregard of the poetic, Puttenham 
counterposes the properly epistemic view that "the phantasticall 
part of man represents the best, the most comely and beautiful 
images or appearances of things, to the soul."10 He continues in 
the following vein: "such persons as be illuminated by the brightest 
irradiations of knowledge and of the verity of due proportion of 
things, they are called by the learned not phantastics but 
euphantasiste, and of this sort of phantasies are all good poets ... 
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all legislators, politicians and counsellors ... " (1589: 15) Here, finally, 
in the antique concept of euphantasy we are returned or at least 
reminded not only of the stakes of eloquence but also of the 
conjunction of the somatic and the legal. The reference to 
euphantasy is a reference to the lyric, to rhythm and speech, song 
and law. The poetic in this sense is directly a training of the body 
or, in the words of the Art de dictier, it is a reference to music, to 
"the last science, which is to be understood as the medicine of the 
arts, because the courage and spirit of those engaged in the other 
arts are tired and bored from their labours." (Deschamps 1392: 269) 
The lawyer, in Fraunce's account, is quintessentially tired and 
bored by the rigours of their labour. The ineloquence or corruption 
of legal speech thus reflects a melancholic langour, a weariness of 
spirit and lassitude in the performance of the tasks of law. The 
remedy is rhythm and a return to the dance of law. The rhetoric of 
law is thus taken to be the site of a reversal of conventional juridical 
expectations. That the poetic and lyric should be seen to take 
precedence over the somatic techniques of rote learning and its 
venal imaginings is but one meaning of the rhetorical figure of the 
euphantasist lawyer. The other and broader sense of euphantasy is 
in Fraunce's words an escape from the violence of legal textuality 
and the compulsion or somatics of interpretation. Here again the 
stake is the dignity and eloquence of law: to train the body to do 
the work of law is to seek through scholarship and pedagogy to 
align the text of law with the eloquence of the disciplines that 
address the care of the soul, or in classical terms with nature. The 
body is the site of such an alignment or euphantasy and it is only 
in the corporeal, in the embodiment of law in speech, that the 
memories and the friendships of which Fraunce wrote can come 
in turn to eloquent expression. 
Notes 
1 In a mildly Kafkaesque twist, it transpires that Fraunce sees the 
temporality of arrest as deriving from the requirement that the person 
arrested be brought "before the law." The law Latin for arrest is either 
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capias or attachias, to which Fraunce adds that "our precept notes it by 
the words duci facias, cause him to be conveyed ... for that the officer 
hath after a sort, taken him before ... some justice of the peace."(64r) 
2 This point can also be made in etymological terms: dogma and 
decorum have common roots and can be interpreted to imply a 
dimension of dream in the the unravelling of thought. See Legendre 
(1986) and the commentary in Goodrich (1990). The concept of 
dogma or in this instance of legal dogmatics, carries with it a sense of 
the imaginings and fantasies that constitute social identity and govern 
the relationships of the public domain. The later tradition distinguished 
honestum,justum and decorum as the three spheres of public action, with 
inevitably indistinct or labile boundaries. 
3 The definition comes from the Digest but is to be found in Fraunce 
and in other contemporaries. See, for example, Sir John Doderidge, 
The English La11:)1er (1631: 28): "knowledge of the law is affirmed to be 
rerum divinarum humanarumque scientid', by which he also affirms that it 
"comprises all other knowledges" and is "the science of sciences." To 
divagate slightly, Fraunce (1588c: Bk 1), in his work on symbols also 
follows the convention of .rymbola heroica in noting the relation between 
visual sign and that which is signified, between mark and dignity, as 
also between body and soul. 
4 Cicero (1923 ed.: xii. 30) remarks: "Many great men have been studious 
to leave behind them statues and portraits (imagines), likenesses not of 
the soul, but of the body; and how much more anxious should we be 
to bequeath an effigy of our minds and characters, wrought and 
elaborated by supreme talents?" 
5 For a recent and, in my view, at times complacent version of this 
argument, see Nussbaum (1995) . James Boyd-White (1990) and 
Richard Weisberg (1992) offer versions of this argument in proposing 
rhetoric as the criterion for evaluating legal judgment. 
6 I discuss the Renaissance discourse on mourning, in Goodrich. (1995: 
16-22) The other crucial discussion is to be found in Legendre. (1997: 
48-54) 
7 Without embarking upon any extended analysis of philosophical 
friendship, it is clear that in Renaissance terms there was a considerable 
weight of affinity, even eros, to the citation and circulation of classic 
and contemporary texts. The disposition towards disputation allowed 
not only the antirrhetic affect of polemic against opponents but also 
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the emotional exposition and naming of the desired texts and loved 
names. Fraunce is particularly prone to this discourse of textual 
friendship and to matching the laudation of friends-Plato, Aristotle, 
Cicero particularly amongst the ancients, and Valla, Hotman and Ramus 
amongst contemporaries. To take one example from Fraunce (1588a: 
67r): ''.Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, magis amica veritas." 
8 My analysis will avoid repeating the general description of Frawice's 
critique of lawyers which is rehearsed at length in "A Short History of 
Failure: Law and Criticism 1560-1620" in Goodrich (1990). There is 
also the excellent brief discussion in Dzialo (1998). 
9 Fraunce (1588a: 117) for instance discusses memory in the standard 
terms of the "comfortable simples" and "orderly diet, exercise ... " and 
the like. For discussion of this theme, see "Eating Law: Commons, 
Common Land, Common Law" in Goodrich (1996) . 
10 The ability to appreciate the epistemological value of phantasms is a 
matter both of method and of mood. The moderns are blind, in 
Puttenham's view, and he proceeds to talk of "these gross heads, not 
being brought up or acquainted with any excellent art, nor able to 
contrive, or in manner conceive any matter of subtlety in any business 
or science do deride and scorn it in all others . . . and whatever devise 
be of rare invention they term phantasticall." The relation between 
phantasm and rhetorical invention is captured in the maxim animam 
non intel/igere absque phantasmal-the soul could not understand without 
phantasms. (1589: 14) 
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